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Cake day: January 30th, 2025

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  • … China’s policy of heavily subsidizing key industries, which allows Chinese manufacturers to produce at a scale and cost that Western companies struggle to match.

    Yes, but it’s not just the subsidies. An additional important factor in this context that the article doesn’t mention is the number of people in China who are forced into modern slavery. Therefore, a strong supply chain law is essential not only with regards to human rights (any trade agreement that does not include this crucial issue is useless imo), but also for a competition policy.

    The article makes several good points how Germany and Europe have an advantage over China. But we need to get the human rights issue, too. That’s a major point.






  • Writer Ben Tarnoff and researcher Dr James Muldoon have been proposing to ‘deprivatise’ the internet. Dr Muldoon writes a lot on ‘digital democracy’ and how the ‘extractivism’ of today’s digital world needs to be rethought, very much a the UK’s Ada Lovelace Institute.

    Their and other people’s ideas are mostly based on cooperatives, which are not new as we know, but barely applied in the technical space.

    There are, however, already first projects in a lot of countries around the globe, and despite in their early stages, many of them appear to be very promising. In the U.S., for example, researcher Trebor Scholz’s Platform Cooperativism Constortium is certainly among the most notable. The organization supports communities from cooperatives that then build more or less the same products and services like the centralized, venture capital-backed surveillance technology (Uber, Amazon, video conferencing tools, …), but are owned on a more collective basis and pursuing a less extractive business model.

    In Europe, the Smart Cooperative was launched as a social economy project by founders from the cultural sector. These visionaries created Smart as an innovative solution for freelance artists and cultural professionals who often work under precarious conditions. Today, the collective has tens of thousands of members, and is active in 7 countries (Belgium, Germany, Sweden, Austria, Italy, Spain, and Portugal).

    In Mexico, Tierra Comun is a similar project and equally successful.

    There are many more across the globe, aiming at solving a huge variety of issues, and they are very promising imho.








  • It’s an interesting article from a unusual point of view (and an unusual source).

    From a macroeconomic point of view, a major problem for Russia’s civilian industry could be a lack of labour (in addition to what the article suggests regarding returning soldiers’ psychological problems), as stated by several (Russian) economists. And even Russian media admitted that private companies in other sectors than military are operating at around 80% of capacity due to a lack of labour. According to the Russian consultancy Yakov and Partners, Russia could reach a worker shortage of 2 to 4 million people by 2030.

    Another problem for Russia on the economic road to peace could be the banks. Sberbank and TVB, both state-owned, have been required by law to fund companies from the military complex at state-subsidised rates, not in the least because Russia’s central bank had to raise interest rates to 21% to curb a devastating inflation. Some other sectors (agriculture, construction) also benefited from state-sponsored lower-than-market rates (these public funds does not count as Russia’s official budget of 40% for military spending afaik).

    According to official numbers by the bank of Russia, this led to an increase of profits for both Sberbank and VTB, but these loans -which essentially means that banks could ‘mint’ a large amount of money within a short time span - now amount to 16% of Russian commercial banks’ total assets. This poses a high risk to the banking sector, and it increases once the war is over and peace breaks out. Central Bank Governor Elvira Nabiullina has warned already late last year that the Russian banking sector’s capital adequacy ratio has dropped by 2 percentage points in the course of 2024, reaching 12.5%. (Simply speaking, the Capital Adequacy Ratio is a metric used by regulators around the globe measuring a bank’s ability to absorb a sufficient amount of loss before they loose depositor funds.) Russia’s ratio is still above the minimum requirement under the so-called Basel III rules (which is 10.5% if I am not mistaken), but the drop is significant, meaning that Russian banks could be quickly running out of cushion to avoid insolvency once the situation changes.

    Russia has also lost its most important economic lifeline, oil and gas, and Europe won’t come back as buyers given that the Kremlin is posing a threat to the continent.

    And all this must be seen as even now, as the war is raging, the Russian economy, despite coming from a relatively low level, is already slowing down. The IMF expects a growth rate of 1.3% this year and 1.2% in 2026. Some time ago, Russian economist Natalia Zubarevich said that in Russia “there will be no collapses, but rather a viscous, slow sinking into backwardness.” Maybe she is right?

    [Edit typo.]
















  • I am not a military expert, so that’s certainly a reason why I can’t follow everything in this article. The Bruegel analysis the Economist mentions, however, says:

    From a macroeconomic perspective, the numbers are small enough for Europe to replace the US fully. Since February 2022, US military support to Ukraine has amounted to €64 billion, while Europe, including the United Kingdom, sent €62 billion. In 2024, US military support amounted to €20 billion out of a total of €42 billion. To replace the US, the EU would thus have to spend only another 0.12 percent of its GDP – a feasible amount […]

    A significantly more challenging scenario for Europe would be an unlikely peace deal accepted by Ukraine. In such a scenario, Russia is likely to continue its military build-up, creating a formidable military challenge to all of the EU in a very short period, given current Russian production. The EU and allies including the UK and Norway would need to accelerate their military build-ups immediately and massively […]

    It also says:

    A Russian attack on a European Union country is thus conceivable. Assessments by NATO, Germany, Poland, Denmark and the Baltic states put Russia as ready to attack within three to ten years 4 . It could be sooner […]

    Europe’s first priority is to continue supporting Ukraine – Ukraine’s experienced military is currently the most effective deterrent against a Russian attack on the EU. If Ukraine decides that a US-Russian deal to end the war is unacceptable – because Putin’s peace guarantees are not credible, for example – Europe is capable of providing additional weapons to Ukraine to ensure its fighting capacities remain as they are currently. Ukraine and the EU rely on some critical US strategic enablers, including intelligence and satellite communications. These are difficult to replace in the short term but there are substitutes if necessary […]

    Rapidly generating such increases [in military equipment and production] requires an extraordinary effort, though experience [in Eruope] shows market economies can do it […]

    Bruegel says -unsurprisingly- that Europe must significantly increase its defense spending, and also makes suggestions how this could be done best (amongst others, by replacing the US military-industrial base). Overall it provides a different picture than the Economist imho.