[issue]: Remove BLOBs from the source tree · Issue #2795 · ventoy/Ventoy
github.com
What happened? Due to the recent XZ-Utils drama I checked the code and I'm appalled. There are more BLOBS than source code. https://github.com/ventoy/Ventoy/tree/3f65f0ef03e4aebcd14f233ca808a4f8946...

I had no idea this issue had been identified. While I find this tool very useful, the project is seeming rather questionable to me now.

  • n2burns@lemmy.ca
    853·
    2 months ago

    I too wish the developer would respond, but I don’t think this is the catastrophe people are making it out to be. One comment seems to explain why these binaries are included:

    Because ventoy supports shim, and by extension secure boot, these files needs to come from a signed Linux distro. In this case they are taken from Fedora releases, and OpenSUSE apparently, as they publish shim binaries and grub binaries signed by their certificate.

      • Quail4789@lemmy.mlEnglish
        273·
        2 months ago

        It matters because nobody is going to check the hashes for all of the files match whenever there’s a change so the maintainer can just replace them with whatever he wants.

        • Pup Biru@aussie.zoneEnglish
          24·
          2 months ago

          that’s what automation is for - nobody is going to manually check them, but anyone is able to automatically set something up to check their hashes in change… the fact that it’s possible that anyone is doing that now that it’s a known issue perhaps makes it less problematic as an attack vector

          • refalo@programming.dev
            41·
            1 month ago

            That is true, but also nobody is doing it. Just like nobody is verifying Signal’s “reproducible builds”.

            • Pup Biru@aussie.zoneEnglish
              4·
              1 month ago

              are you sure?

              there could be thousands just waiting for a failure to come out and say “HEY THIS IS DODGY”

              • refalo@programming.dev
                1·
                1 month ago

                Yea because I tested it myself. Nobody else seems to care, and if they did, I would think there would be a public way to see regular test results regardless.

                I know this exists for some projects, but somehow nothing privacy-sensitive

          • Quail4789@lemmy.mlEnglish
            131·
            2 months ago

            The amount of malware you can cram in a source-code patch without drawing attention vs. in a binary is vastly different.

            There’s also the fact that if you want to ship binaries, you can just wget them from source during the build process. Not a perfect solution but much better than what’s ventoy doing. The source code updates works the same in every project because it has to. That’s why this is drawing more attention.

            • Ferk@lemmy.ml
              3·
              2 months ago

              That’s ok if we are talking about malware publicly shown in the published source code… but there’s also the possibility of a private source-code patch with malware that it’s secretly being applied when building the binaries for distribution. Having clean source code in the repo is not a guarantee that the source code is the same that was used to produce the binaries.

              This is why it’s important for builds to be reproducible, any third party should be able to build their own binary from clean source code and be able to obtain the exact same binary with the same hash. If the hashes match, then you have a proof of the binary being clean. You have this same problem with every single binary distribution, even the ones that don’t include pre-compiled binaries in their repo.

              • refalo@programming.dev
                2·
                1 month ago

                The problem is not near enough projects support reproducible builds, and many that do aren’t being regularly verified, at least publicly.

                • Ferk@lemmy.ml
                  1·
                  1 month ago

                  Yes, that’s why im saying that this kind of problem isn’t something particular about this project.

                  In fact I’m not sure if it’s the case that the builds aren’t reproducible/verifiable for these binaries in ventoy. And if they aren’t, then I think it’s in the upstream projects where it should be fixed.

                  Of course ventoy should try to provide traceability for the specific versions they are using, but in principle I don’t think it should be a problem to rely on those binaries if they are verifiable… just the same way as we rely on binaries for many dynamic libraries in a lot of distributions. After all, Ventoy is closer to being an OS/distribution than a particular program.

    • grue@lemmy.worldEnglish
      337·
      2 months ago

      On the contrary: that just goes to show what a fucking catastrophe for software freedom “Secure[sic] Boot” is.

    • nialv7@lemmy.world
      17·
      2 months ago

      While this is true, it only requires the shim and grub to be copied for another distro.

      From other comments there are a lot more blobs than just these two.

          • davad@lemmy.world
            3·
            1 month ago

            I think they did say that in the older thread. But for proper security, you shouldn’t have to trust them. You should have build tools that will re-fetch everything to create an identical build. That gives a clear chain of custody, which proves that morning has been tampered with.

    • infeeeee@lemm.ee
      111·
      2 months ago

      It sounds to me as a documentation issue, as the next comment says, simply including a wget script should solve this.